MEMBER STATE LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF EU LAW BEFORE ENGLISH COURTS by Tomulić Vehovec, Marjeta
369CYELP 8 [2012] 369-410
MEMBER STATE LIABILITY FOR BREACH 
OF EU LAW BEFORE ENGLISH COURTS*
Marjeta TomuliÊ Vehovec∗∗
Summary: This article discusses the problem of establishing a causal 
link between breach and damage in cases of Member State liability for 
breach of EU law before English courts. It tackles the presumption that 
the condition of direct causal link is left to national courts to determine. 
The author examines EU legal rules concerning Member State liability and 
their interaction with national law. As an example of a national law, the 
author examines English law, particularly the rules which are relevant for 
causation in Member State liability cases. The results show that the Mem-
ber State liability principle and the conditions established by the Court of 
Justice of the EU are likely to inﬂ uence the establishment of a causal link 
before national courts in Member State liability cases.
I Introduction and scope
The aim of this article is to show that the rules relating to fault li-
ability in the sense of a sufﬁ ciently serious breach of EU law inﬂ uence 
the establishment of a causal link between that breach and any damage 
sustained.1 The rationale of such an argument is to show that in Member 
State liability cases, the condition of direct causal link is not fully decen-
tralised and left to national courts to determine. 
In Member State liability cases, the Court of Justice has left the con-
dition of causal link to be established by national courts. But which law 
should be applied? The Court established three conditions of liability: 1 
the rule of EU law must confer rights to the individual; 2 the breach must 
be sufﬁ ciently serious; 3 there must exist a direct causal link between 
the breach committed by the Member State and the resulting damage. 
* This article was produced as a result of research conducted in 2010 at the Institute Suisse 
de Droit Comparé in Lausanne, Switzerland and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
and International Private Law in Hamburg, Germany. The author would like to express her 
gratitude to the Institutes for their grants and the opportunity of carrying out research and 
studying on their premises.
∗∗ Marjeta TomuliÊ Vehovec, PhD. Assistant at the Department of Private International and 
European Law, Faculty of Law, University of Rijeka, Croatia. E-mail: marjeta@pravri.hr.
1 A causal link connects the breaching conduct with the ensuing damage. Therefore, the 
rules of causation are inﬂ uenced by the standard of liability and damage. This article will 
closely examine the connection between fault liability and the establishment of causal link. 
While the issue of damage is also very important for causation, it will not be examined in 
detail here due to the vastness of the subject.
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It concluded that these ‘are necessary and sufﬁ cient to found a right in 
individuals to obtain redress.’2 It speciﬁ ed that
it is on the basis of the rules of national law on liability that the State 
must make reparation for the consequences of the loss and dam-
age caused. In the absence of Community legislation, it is for the 
internal legal order of each Member State to … lay down the detailed 
procedural rules for legal proceedings intended fully to safeguard the 
rights which individuals derive from Community law.3
The EU principles of equivalence and effectiveness must always be 
respected. Therefore, EU law should be primarily applied. If it has gaps, 
then national law may be used but always respecting the basic principles 
of EU law. EU law does not clearly lay down rules concerning causation. 
In Brasserie, the Court generally established a parallel between the con-
ditions for liability of EU institutions and that of Member States.4 It even 
indicated a test for a sufﬁ ciently serious breach which may be used in 
both groups of cases. However, without any particular justiﬁ cation, no 
particular parallel was deﬁ ned for the condition of a direct causal link. 
The Court only concluded ‘[a]s for the third condition, it is for the nation-
al courts to determine whether there is a direct causal link between the 
breach of the obligation borne by the State and the damage sustained 
by the injured parties.’5 Despite this general uniﬁ cation and the obvious 
commonalities between the two sets of conditions, the cross-fertilisa-
tion of case law is limited.6 Signiﬁ cant differences remain. The discretion 
available to EU institutions and Member States is very different, which 
inﬂ uences liability. Serious breach factors known in Member State liabil-
ity cases are not applied in EU liability cases. Thus, in terms of the aim 
of this work, where the condition of a sufﬁ ciently serious breach of the 
Member State inﬂ uences the establishment of a direct causal link, the li-
ability of the EU will be disregarded. In Member State liability cases, the 
Court precisely determined the criteria based on which it will determine 
the existence of a sufﬁ ciently serious breach, and those criteria are to 
some extent applied in causation. EU Liability is not established in the 
same way and will therefore be left out of this analysis.
2  Joined cases C-46/93 and 48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III [1996] ECR 
I-1029, para 66.
3  Emphasis added. Joined cases C-6/90 and 9/90 Francovich, Bonifaci and others v Italy 
[1991] ECR I-5357, para 42.
4  Brasserie (n 2) paras 42, 47 ff.
5  Brasserie (n 2) para 65.
6  W van Gerven, ‘Taking Article 215(2) EC Seriously’ in J Beatson and T Tridimas (eds), 
New Directions in European Public Law (Hart Publishing 1998) 35.
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It will be ﬁ rst shown how a causal link is established in the Eng-
lish legal system and then parallels will be drawn with the condition of 
direct causal link in EU law. The causal tests used in national law in 
cases in which the tortfeasor’s liability is based on fault and when it is 
strict will be examined. This is because the same situation is encoun-
tered within the condition of sufﬁ ciently serious breach, which can be 
fault-based if discretion was available or strict if there was no discretion. 
The presumption of this article is that the Court has, to a certain extent, 
stipulated the causal test that national courts should use. The reason for 
such a presumption is that the questions of fault, negligence and respon-
sibility for the resulting damage are determined in English law by the 
same test.7 Translated into EU law, this would mean that factors which 
help deﬁ ne the sufﬁ cient seriousness of a breach are also factors which 
should help deﬁ ne the extent of the responsibility of the State. A connec-
tion will be shown in national law between duty, the standard of care 
and causality. This link is unbreakable and should also be respected in 
the application of EU law.
The application of the Member State liability principle will be ex-
plained through the structure of English tort law. The use of the term 
English law refers to the law of England and Wales. National law cannot 
be disregarded, because it serves as the basis for the application of EU 
law. English law does not abstractly deﬁ ne certain rights as continental 
systems do. It only deﬁ nes various torts. These torts each have a set of 
conditions which have to be satisﬁ ed in order for a claim to succeed. 
Therefore, the main issue in the application of the Member State liability 
principle is, which one of these incompatible torts may be best adapted 
to suit EU law? To cut a long story short, it will be shown that it is really 
irrelevant whether an existing breach of statutory duty tort is adapted or 
a completely new ‘Eurotort’ is devised. There are certain rules on fault 
liability and strict liability in national law which are always applicable 
across all relevant torts. Based on the results of the interaction between 
the relevant national causal rules and the principles of EU law, an at-
tempt will be made to try and construct a framework of causal tests 
which could possibly be used in Member State liability claims. 
II The Member State liability principle and causation
The Member State liability principle was pronounced by the Court 
in the Francovich8 case some twenty years ago. Since then, the Court 
has substantively examined this principle in fewer than forty cases. The 
7  HLA Hart and T Honoré, Causation in the Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1985) 255.
8  Francovich (n 3).
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number seems to be low, but if we consider that Member State liability 
cases are ﬁ rst examined at the national level, their number is in reality 
more signiﬁ cant than appears at ﬁ rst sight. In addition to other condi-
tions, national courts should determine whether there is a direct causal 
link between the breach of the obligation borne by the Member State 
and the damage sustained by the injured party. This issue is regulated 
by both procedural and substantive rules. Member States possess pro-
cedural autonomy, but EU law has priority in regulating the substantive 
issues. If EU law has gaps, recourse to national law is possible in order to 
ﬁ ll them, but only under the condition that such rules respect the princi-
ples of effectiveness and equivalence stipulated by EU law.9
The Court has repeatedly held that it is for national courts to de-
termine the existence of a direct causal link. However, that does not de-
centralise the condition, because a causal link is based primarily on EU 
law.10 Causation depends on two elements: the facts of the case and sub-
stantive law. In other words, the facts of the case are examined through 
questions posed by the law. National courts are best suited to observe 
the facts of the case, but the independent application of national causal 
rules could amount to renationalisation of the whole principle. This is 
especially so because causal questions concerning consequence, effect, 
cause, remoteness and superseding cause are never solely questions of 
fact. The answer to these questions is to be found in analysing the lim-
its of liability set by the legal rules which apply to the particular case. 
More precisely, the national judges need to analyse the scope, purpose 
or policy behind the rules of Member State liability. A causal link cannot 
be found by subsuming the facts of the case to some general deﬁ nition 
of causal connection. The court must ﬁ nd such answers by scrutinis-
ing the character of the EU law rules and determining whether Member 
State liability should be extended to the damage which occurred in the 
way that it did.11 
‘[I]n many important branches of the civil law causal connection 
enters into the deﬁ nition of civil wrong [e.g. sufﬁ ciently serious breach] 
and it must be established to show existence of liability as distinct from 
9  On the issue of lack of procedural autonomy for Member States in general, see CN Kak-
ouris, ‘Do the Member States Possess Judicial Procedural “Autonomy”?’ (1997) 34 CMLR 
1389, 1393, 1396, 1404, 1405.
10  Opposing views are given by Biondi and Farley, who consider that a causal link is the 
condition which has to be established based on evaluation of the facts and acquired evi-
dence. For that reason, they conclude the Court maintains control over the ﬁ rst two condi-
tions of Member State liability in damages while fully decentralising the third one. See A 
Biondi and M Farley, The Right to Damages in European Law (Vol 5 of Kluwer European Law 
Collection, Kluwer Law International 2009) 55.
11  For general views on causal questions in law, see Hart and Honoré (n 7) 4.
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its extent.’12 Therefore, when the Court established tests and factors to be 
used to determine the sufﬁ ciency of serious breach, to a certain extent it 
also determined causal connection. This is particularly true for substan-
tial causal rules which govern the choice as to which standard of proof is 
to be applied. For example, a causal link may be presumed or proven in 
a certain case, but the selection as to which route the national court will 
take in establishing causation depends on the prior qualiﬁ cation of li-
ability. EU law rules regulating the purpose of conferred rights and sufﬁ -
ciently serious breach are the substantive rules which the national court 
must apply when qualifying the liability of the Member State. Therefore, 
the Court did not fully decentralise the third condition and leave it en-
tirely to national courts.
III The relationship between EU and national law in a Member 
State liability claim
A Member State liability claim is derived directly from EU law.13 
Tort law is a product of common law. It has been created in the course of 
judicial practice. The purpose of tort law is to compensate the claimant 
for the wrongful action of the defendant.14 EU law does not regulate how 
national law is to be applied to a Member State liability claim; it is for 
each Member State to regulate it for itself, providing that it respects the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The basis for the liability of 
the State must be found within individual torts or remedies. If a claim-
ant wants to ﬁ le a claim in a certain tort, he has to satisfy the particu-
lar conﬁ guration of that tort. EU law requires national law to match a 
national law remedy to an already existing right. English law functions 
in exactly the opposite way; it has an existing remedy and the rights are 
deﬁ ned in their light. In addition to all this, the English legal system is 
in constant development through case law and often the trend of the 
law is not determined. This national law has developed a particular ‘al-
lergy’ towards ﬁ xed rules, and functions mostly based on the principles 
developed in case law. This means that sometimes only indications are 
given of what may be included in a rule and what may not. Often, one 
problem may be resolved in more than one way and at various levels of 
legal examination of the case. This makes English law slippery ground 
12  Hart and Honoré (n 7) 7.
13  ‘[T]he State must make reparation for the consequences of the loss and damage caused 
in accordance with the domestic rules on liability, provided that the conditions for repara-
tion of loss and damage laid down by national law must not be less favourable than those 
relating to similar domestic claims and must not be such as in practice to make it impos-
sible or excessively difﬁ cult to obtain reparation.’ See Brasserie (n 2) para 67.
14  A Dugdale, ‘United Kingdom’ International Encyclopedia of Laws, Tort Law (11th supp 
2007) 14.
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for application of EU law, because the Court of Justice is always at least 
one step behind. To illustrate, in Brasserie in 1996, the Court stipulated 
that the proof of abuse of power in the tort of misfeasance in public ofﬁ ce 
was contrary to the principle of effectiveness of EU law.15 However, the 
basic requirements of this tort changed in Three Rivers16 in 2001 when 
the test for misfeasance was broadened. Now it is not certain whether 
this tort is still contrary to the principles of EU law or not. Probably it is, 
but until the Court has a new chance of deciding on this issue, it is for 
national judges to examine and conclude in each case.
A) Application of English law torts in conformity with EU law 
The statute entitled the European Communities Act 1972 (herein-
after: ECA) incorporated EU law into national law.17 This text prevails 
over the sovereign power of Parliament, and any issue of EU law in legal 
proceedings before national courts is to be decided according to the case 
law of the Court.18 Hence, the ECA serves as the basis for the application 
of EU law and the Member State liability principle which is inherent in 
the Treaties. Only if EU law has intended to confer rights on individuals 
will a statutory duty exist according to the ECA, and a private action 
for damages be available. Public bodies have powers and duties given to 
them by statutes. The granting of statutory powers also means confer-
ment of discretion. The ECA empowers the public administration to make 
amendments to United Kingdom law in order to implement EU law. This 
is an important new source of administrative power and consequently a 
new head of government liability.19
In practice, this means that EU law, as far as it regulates, has prec-
edence over national law, which should be automatically disapplied if it 
contravenes EU law. A Member State liability claim is an independent 
claim in EU law, and any national rules which are applicable to it are to 
be adapted from any comparable national State liability claim. The result 
15  ‘[A]ny condition that may be imposed by English law on State liability requiring proof of 
misfeasance in public ofﬁ ce, such an abuse of power being inconceivable in the case of the 
legislature, is also such as in practice to make it impossible or extremely difﬁ cult to obtain 
effective reparation for loss or damage resulting from a breach of Community law where the 
breach is attributable to the national legislature.’ Brasserie (n 2) para 73.
16  Three Rivers District Council & Ors v Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48.
17  ‘[R]ights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions’ as well as all remedies and pro-
cedures deriving from the Treaties, ‘are without further enactment to be given legal effect 
… recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly’, and 
this includes ‘any enactment passed or to be passed’. See European Communities Act 1972 
sub-s 2 (1) and (4).
18  Sir W Wade, Administrative Law (9th edn, OUP 2004) 193-94.
19  Wade (n 18) 213-15, 744.
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of the Francovich case law is that State ‘liability can be imposed in a wid-
er range of situations than those so far recognised by English courts.’20 
EU law requires that individuals have the right to use a remedy in dam-
ages to compensate for losses due to the breach of their EU rights.21 
The question is then through which tort may individuals seek dam-
ages?
The tort of misfeasance in public ofﬁ ce depends on the intention or 
recklessness of the tortfeasor.22 If applied in EU law, this tort limits the 
possibility of acquiring damages with its requirement for intentional or 
reckless unlawful conduct.23 The Court of Justice of the EU determined 
in the Brasserie case that this tort is not applicable to the liability of 
legislative bodies.24 Due to the set requirement of intentional or reckless 
unlawful conduct, this tort would probably be inapplicable where breach 
of EU law is committed by administrative25 or judicial authorities. In 
2001, the Three Rivers26case lowered the requirements for misfeasance 
for the ﬁ rst time, which might affect the application of EU law. But until 
the Court decides differently, it will be held that this tort is incompatible 
with the application of a Member State liability claim.
The tort of negligence does not seem to be suitable, because there 
has to exist a negligent breach committed in the exercise of an adminis-
trative or legislative function. However, for such a negligent breach to be 
committed, the public authority has to have a duty of care, and ‘legisla-
tive functions probably impose no duty of care at all’.27 The duty of care 
generally cannot exist in the case of pure economic loss (the damage 
must be actual).28 Hence, damages cannot be awarded for such type of 
harm, which consequently limits liability in EU law as well.29 In addi-
tion, Member State liability does not depend on the ﬁ nding of fault in the 
20  S Deakin, A Johnston and B Markesinis, Tort Law (5th edn, Clarendon Press 2003) 405.
21  C Lewis, Judicial Remedies in Public Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 588-89, paras 15-058, 
15-059 and 15-083.
22  Three Rivers (n 16).
23  AG Tesauro in Brasserie (n 2) para 7.
24  Brasserie (n 2) para 73.
25  ‘[I]t may be taken on the basis of the Court’s wording, that the misfeasance tort is also 
incompatible with the [EU] law in case of liability for acts of the administration.’ See C van 
Dam, European Tort Law (OUP 2006) 498, at 1804-5.
26  Three Rivers (n 16).
27  Wade (n 18) 769.
28  C Walton, R Cooper and SE Wood, Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (11th edn, con-
sultant ed R Percy, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) (with 1st, 2nd and 3rd supp up to date on 19 June 
2009) 15, para 1-29.
29  AG Tesauro in Brasserie (n 2) para 7.
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sense in which it is deﬁ ned in the tort of negligence, which renders this 
tort unsuitable.30 
The tort of breach of statutory duty is deemed to be the most ad-
equate of all the national remedies provided by English law. Despite the 
initial reservations that this tort was not compatible with the application 
of EU law, views have changed.31 Craig has argued that national courts 
should adapt domestic heads of liability to the requirements of EU law.32 
This is exactly what the High Court did in Factortame 7 when it applied 
the tort of breach of statutory duty: 
In Community law, the liability of a State for a breach of Community 
law is described as non-contractual. In English law there has been 
some debate as to the correct nature of the liability for a breach of 
Community law. In our judgment it is best understood as a breach 
of statutory duty.33 
More precisely, ‘the cause of action [of the Member State liabil-
ity claim] is sui generis, it is of the character of a breach of statutory 
duty.’34 The three conditions of Member State liability, argues Craig, can 
be incorporated within the three conditions of breach of statutory duty, 
namely the existence of a statutory duty, the breach of that duty and the 
causing of damage.35 
The ‘Eurotort’ seems to be more and more frequently used as a basis 
for claims.36 Craig considers that the remedies in damages with an EU 
law element ‘can be treated as giving rise to an autonomous cause of ac-
tion, without the necessity of ﬁ tting them into any pre-existing domestic 
heads of liability’.37 The Member State liability cases decided in national 
courts have been dominated by the Court’s jurisprudence. Hence, Stan-
ton reasons that the new head of liability, the ‘Eurotort’, is now a part 
30  M Hoskins, ‘Rebirth of the Innominate Tort?’ in Beatson and Tridimas (n 6) 93.
31  AG Tesauro in Brasserie (n 2) para 7; Hoskins (n 30) 96; K Stanton, ‘New Forms of the 
Tort of Breach of Statutory Duty’ (2004) 120 LQR 324, 326.
32  See P Craig, ‘Once More Unto the Breach: The Community, the State and Damages Li-
ability’ (1997) 113 LQR, 67-94; for criticism, see J Allison, ‘Transplantation and Cross-ferti-
lisation’ in Beatson and Tridimas (n 6), 169-182; also see AM Dugdale (ed), Clerk & Lindsell 
on Torts (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006-2007) paras 9-45 and 9-47.
33  R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 7) [2000] EWHC Technol-
ogy 179, para 80.
34  Factortame (n 33) para 84. Scholarly opinion supports this view. See P Leyland and G 
Anthony, Textbook on Administrative Law (5th edn, OUP 2005) 103.
35  Craig (n 32) 93.
36  K Oliphant, ‘England and Wales’ in H Koziol and BC Steininger (eds) European Tort Law 
(Springer-Verlag 2008) 233.
37  P Craig, Administrative Law (5th edn, Thomson Sweet & Maxwell 2003) 934.
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of domestic proceedings and references to breach of statutory duty are a 
redundancy.38
As a last resort, there have been proposals for legal reform. The Law 
Commission in Consultation Paper No 18739 of 2008 proposed a reform 
of the public and private rules for administrative redress. Aiming to sim-
plify the area of State liability, it suggested that the torts of misfeasance 
in public ofﬁ ce and breach of statutory duty should be signiﬁ cantly lim-
ited, while the tort of negligence should be allowed to expand. The Com-
mission drew inspiration from the Francovich case law and the condition 
of ‘sufﬁ ciently serious breach’, but the test was adapted for the purposes 
of English law. Even though this proposal failed due to strong criticism, 
some conclusions may be drawn. First, obviously English law on State 
liability should be modernised, as the two public law torts are exces-
sively limiting. Consequently, this problem affects Member State liability 
claims. Second, if the tort of negligence in English law could be modern-
ised by applying conditions drawn from EU law, then perhaps a Member 
State liability case could be introduced based on a tort of negligence.
B) Strict or negligence-based liability determines which tort
There are two possibilities in English law for the introduction of a 
Member State liability claim before national courts. The ﬁ rst is the ap-
plication of the tort of breach of statutory duty in an adapted form. The 
second is the application of the Eurotort. However, both these solutions 
are the same in practice. Whether it is the adaptation of the old tort or 
the building of a completely new one, the applicable rules of English 
law will always be used in the same way. Extra contractual liability or 
tort liability always revolves around three issues: 1) whether a certain 
obligation towards the plaintiff exists; 2) whether that obligation has 
been breached; and 3) whether a causal link exists between the damage 
and the breach. EU law determines the ﬁ rst two conditions and Member 
States have very little room for the application of national law. The issue 
of causal link is not entirely left to national law. The condition of sufﬁ -
ciently serious breach also inﬂ uences causality. Depending on whether 
the basis of liability in EU law is fault-based or strict, adequate national 
rules will be applied and these are always found in the tort of breach of 
statutory duty or the tort of negligence. In cases of fault liability, causal 
rules are borrowed from the tort of negligence and in strict liability de-
pend largely on the wording of the statute. Therefore, both torts of negli-
38  Stanton (n 31) 329-30.
39  Law Commission, Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen (Law Com, Con-
sultation Paper No 187, 17 June 2008) < http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/
cp187_Administrative_Redress_Consultation.pdf> accessed 10 September 2012.
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gence and breach of statutory duty will be examined. The emphasis will 
be put on causal inquiry, but since this is not an independent condition 
of liability, other relevant parts of these torts will be presented as well.
IV Member State liability claims in English law
The application of a Member State liability claim in English law will 
be examined on the assumption that the tort of breach of statutory duty 
will serve as the basis for the claim in national law. This tort can be 
based on fault or strict liability depending on the relevant statute. If the 
statute leaves a certain margin of discretion, it is fault-based and this 
tort overlaps with the tort of negligence. If an obligation of result is stipu-
lated, liability is strict and the rules of tort of breach of statutory duty 
apply. The situation is essentially the same if the Eurotort is the basis of 
a Member State liability claim. If liability is based on fault, rules regulat-
ing the tort of negligence apply, and if liability is strict, the wording of the 
relevant EU legislation applies. National courts are bound by the rulings 
of the Court and the rules stipulated thereby. A remedy in EU law will 
have to be available before national courts for breach of EU law. It is clear 
now that an ultra vires administrative action which is not actionable as a 
breach of statutory duty will confer a right to an action in damages if the 
case is one of EU law and that law requires reparation.40
A Member State liability claim depends on three conditions: ‘the 
rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; 
the breach must be sufﬁ ciently serious; and there must be a direct caus-
al link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and the 
damage sustained by the injured parties.’41
A) Conferment of rights on the individual
This condition of the Member State liability principle depends en-
tirely on EU law. National courts only declare whether a rule of EU law 
confers rights on individuals or not. In an English law claim of breach of 
statutory duty, the claimant must ﬁ rst establish a cause of action. How-
ever, if EU law confers rights on individuals, a remedy must be available 
before national courts and any incompatible conditions of national law 
will have to be set aside.42 
40  Wade (n 18) 786-87.
41  Brasserie (n 2) para 51.
42  The condition of national law ‘is whether from the provision and structure of the statute 
an intention can be gathered to create a private law remedy’. See the reasoning of Lord 
Steyn in Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, para 3. This 
is irrelevant in EU law, because the Member State liability principle itself gives individuals 
the right to claim damages where their rights have been breached and damage caused. 
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B) Sufﬁ ciently serious breach or fault-based liability
The condition of sufﬁ ciently serious breach is based on fault if the 
rule of EU law does not provide for strict liability. This condition of Mem-
ber State liability relies somewhat on national law. In this sense, nation-
al law may affect the application of EU law. When liability is fault-based, 
the tort of breach of statutory duty and tort of negligence inevitably in-
tertwine in practice. Thus, the relevant English tort law will be discussed 
ﬁ rst and EU law will follow.
Negligent behaviour usually refers to careless or faulty conduct, but 
it can also relate to a state of mind (to distinguish it from intention) or to 
a breach of duty to take care imposed by statute or common law.43 The 
tort of negligence regulates any such conduct. Where the statute leaves 
a certain amount of discretion, liability depends on negligence and the 
tort of breach of statutory duty automatically overlaps with the tort of 
negligence. More precisely, the duty to take care in English law can arise 
from statute or from common law. Depending on the case, a statutory 
duty may be more or less extensive or the same as the common law duty 
of care.44
The tort of negligence differs from other torts in that it does not 
protect a particular interest, but is based on the conduct of the defend-
ant. That is why it can be imposed on many different interests if they 
are harmed by the conduct in question. Consequently, it is possible that 
this tort overlaps with other torts. Lord Browne-Wilkinson considered 
the overlap between the tort of breach of statutory duty and the tort of 
negligence in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC.45 He categorised such actions 
as those which are based on a common law duty of care arising either 
from the imposition of a statutory duty or from the performance of it. In 
other words, if claimants can show that a duty of care was owed to them, 
they can bring an action in negligence despite the fact that the defendant 
acted in accordance with his statutory powers.46 
43  Walton, Cooper and Wood (n 28) 3, para 1-01.
44  Walton, Cooper and Wood (n 28) 13, para 1-24.
45  ‘(A) actions for breach of statutory duty simpliciter (i.e. irrespective of carelessness); 
(B) actions based solely on the careless performance of a statutory duty in the absence of 
any other common law right of action; 
(C) actions based on a common law duty of care arising either from the imposition of the 
statutory duty or from the performance of it; 
(D) misfeasance in public ofﬁ ce, i.e. the failure to exercise, or the exercise of, statutory pow-
ers either with the intention to injure the plaintiff or in the knowledge that the conduct is 
unlawful.’ See X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 AC 633, 730-31.
46  Dugdale (ed) (n 32) para 8-01; also C Booth and D Squires, The Negligence Liability of 
Public Authorities (OUP 2006) 289-90, para 6.32.
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There are opposing views which state that ‘English law has asserted 
that breach of statutory duty is a tort in its own right distinct from neg-
ligence.’47 However, where the tort of breach of statutory duty concerns 
conduct based on fault, the two torts overlap. In fact, there is a presump-
tion that liability in negligence will arise if an activity authorised by 
statute is performed negligently.48 
If the tort of breach of statutory duty is adapted to ﬁ t the require-
ments of EU law, then the overlapping issues of the tort of negligence will 
also have to be adapted. ‘[T]he plaintiff will then also have to show the 
requisites of a common law duty of care, in particular satisfying the re-
quirement that it is fair, just and reasonable to impose this duty.’49 Would 
this mean that in addition to sufﬁ ciently serious breach, the claimant 
will have to prove the negligence of the public authority? This would 
amount to an additional hurdle for the claimant and should be excluded 
altogether. Indeed, negligence could be excluded as a condition of liability 
because it overlaps with the ﬁ rst and third conditions set by the Court. 
In fact, the condition of sufﬁ ciently serious breach of EU law is richer and 
better worked out than its national counterpart.50
1) Careless performance of a statutory duty
If the claimant alleges that the exercise of statutory powers was 
carelessly performed, he has to demonstrate that there would have been 
a duty of care in common law in the same circumstances.51 It is at this 
point that the elements of tort of negligence enter a case that initially 
started as a breach of statutory duty. The careless performance of a stat-
utory duty includes an existing statutory duty and a negligent breach of 
it. A tort of negligence is established if the facts show that the defendant: 
a) owed a duty of care towards the plaintiff; b) that the defendant was 
negligent in breach of that duty; and c) that the breach caused damage 
to the plaintiff which was not too remote a consequence of the negligence 
in law.52 The claim can allege one of two issues. First, that a statutory 
duty gives rise to a common law duty of care owed to the plaintiff by the 
defendant to do or refrain from doing a particular act. Second, which is 
47  Stanton (n 31) 333.
48  Geddis v Proprietors of Bann Reservoir [1878] 3 AC 430 (HL).
49  Craig (n 32) 92-93.
50  Craig (n 32) 94.
51  V Harpwood, Modern Tort Law (7th edn, Taylor and Francis 2008) 195.
52  X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC (n 45) 712 (Evans LJ). In addition, in negligence actions a 
judge may use presumptions of public policy and broader public interest, which can result 
in the failure of an action in negligence. See G Anthony, UK Public Law and European Law 
(Hart Publishing 2002) 142.
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more common, that in the course of carrying out a statutory duty, the 
defendant has brought about such a relationship between himself and 
the plaintiff as to give rise to a duty of care in common law. A further 
variant in cases of vicarious liability is a claim by the plaintiff that, 
whether or not the authority is itself under a duty of care to the plaintiff, 
its servant in the course of performing the statutory function was under 
a common law duty of care for breach of which the authority is vicari-
ously liable.53
This categorisation of the tort of breach of statutory duty is relevant 
for EU law if a Member State liability claim is to be applied in national 
law by way of adaptation of this tort. The category of careless perform-
ance of a statutory duty includes cases where a statutory duty allegedly 
exists and there is a negligent breach of it. Therefore, even if the tort of 
negligence is considered inadaptable to EU law by itself, it is relevant as 
a part of the tort of breach of statutory duty. When national courts deal 
with a Member State liability claim which is based on fault, they have to 
apply national rules which are relevant for such a matter. Fault-based li-
ability of the State is regulated within the tort of negligence. This is true 
no matter which national tort serves as the basis for the application of 
EU law. Let us examine the elements constituting the negligent breach 
of a statutory duty.
a) Duty owed 
The notion of the duty of care does not have an equivalent in civil-
law-based legal systems. Causation, fault or damage accomplishes the 
task that the duty of care performs in English law. Policies are intro-
duced through this concept and clearly determine the outcome of the 
case. For example, sometimes the policy of English law is to protect only 
certain kinds of damage, such as physical injury and damage to prop-
erty (to the detriment of pure economic loss).54 
This test is concerned with the relationship between the parties and 
asks whether the nature of this relationship required a duty of care. In 
other words, it asks whether the duty towards the claimant existed and 
whether it aimed at protecting him. Speciﬁ cally, it has to be proven that 
the courts recognise as actionable such careless causing of the kind of 
damage as the claimant’s damage, to such a type of person as the claim-
ant, and by the type of person as the defendant. The test includes three 
53  X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC (n 45) 730, 735.
54  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 77.
382 Marjeta TomuliÊ Vehovec: Member State Liability for Breach of EU Law ... 
stages: foreseeability;55 proximity;56 and inquiry into whether it is fair, 
just and reasonable57 to impose such a duty.58
However, the duty of care is restricted where the defendant is re-
sponsible for public services (other areas include psychiatric injury or 
distress, birth of an unwanted child, attempted rescue, omission in as-
sistance or protection of the victim and pure economic loss), and gener-
alised policy reasons will not be enough for the establishment of a duty, 
and attention will also have to be given to the particular circumstances 
of the case.59 This restriction of the duty of care means that in such 
cases, the tort of negligence has special treatment. The additional area 
of inquiry relates to justiciability and reasonableness in the exercise of 
statutory discretion.60 The House of Lords endorsed a strict public law 
hurdle in cases where public authorities exercising discretionary powers 
may have acted negligently.61 The public authority had to act contrary to 
public law or outside their area of discretion, ie irrationally, in order to be 
55  The judge considers whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable for the defendant. 
This stage seems like the concept of the expected standard of a reasonable person which 
is used in other legal systems (eg French or German). A general class of relationship must 
be determined within which this particular case may be assessed. The claimant has to fall 
within the class of persons who might suffer such a kind of loss and towards whom the no-
tional duty exists. It is a question of the reasonable foreseeability of harm and what would a 
reasonable person in the defendant’s position have foreseen. In the words of Lord Diplock, 
‘I should therefore hold that any duty of a Borstal ofﬁ cer to use reasonable care to prevent 
a Borstal trainee from escaping from his custody was owed only to persons whom he could 
reasonably foresee had property situated in the vicinity’. See Home Ofﬁ ce v Dorset Yacht Co 
Ltd [1970] UKHL 2, 38; see also Dugdale (ed) (n 32) paras 8-06, 8-07.
56  Proximity is determined based on the ‘neighbourhood principle’, meaning that the duty 
is owed ‘to persons so closely and directly affected’ by the defendant’s act that he should 
have thought about them. However, the element of proximity cannot be divorced from fore-
seeability, because these two together constitute the basis of the neighbourhood principle. 
Depending on the circumstances of the case, the forms which proximity takes may consist 
of physical as well as causal closeness. See Dugdale (ed) (n 32) paras 8-12, 8-16.
57  This test was developed in Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) 617-
18. The test which helps determine if it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care 
upon a defendant allows the judge to consider issues of legal policy. The judge has to apply 
a test of ordinary reason and common sense according to his own belief. See Dugdale (ed) 
(n 32) para 8-17.
58  Dugdale (n 14) 18. See the same author in Dugdale (ed) (n 32) para 8-05.
59  Dugdale (ed) (n 32) para 14-12; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 376.
60  Walton, Cooper and Wood (n 28) 841, para 11-09.
61  ‘[T]he minimum pre-conditions for basing a duty of care upon the existence of a statu-
tory power … are, ﬁ rst, that it would in the circumstances have been irrational not to have 
exercised the power, so that there was in effect a public law duty to act, and secondly, that 
there are exceptional grounds for holding that the policy of the statute requires compen-
sation to be paid to persons who suffer loss because the power was not exercised … [T]he 
fact that Parliament has conferred a discretion must be some indication that the policy of 
the act conferring the power was not to create a right to compensation.’ See Stovin v Wise 
[1996] UKHL 15, 29.
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subject to a claim of negligence. This irrationality was taken as a guide 
for the assessment of the justiciability of the claim. In this sense, issues 
of public law liability inﬂ uence liability in tort but do not determine it.62
Common law does not recognise liability for pure omissions, that 
is to say for conduct where a person just sat by and observed the harm 
occurring but did not help in creating it.63 However, this principle does 
not apply to public services if the particular circumstances of the case 
justify reliance of members of the public on them.64 
Would this national law test of the duty of care be applicable in a 
Member State liability claim? EU law grants a right to damages if the 
three conditions of Member State liability are met. Hence, the intention 
of Parliament to create a right to compensation or not should be irrel-
evant in EU law. In English law, where a statute does not expressly give a 
right of action, the intention of Parliament is interpreted by the courts. 
Low intensity judicial review in order to determine whether there has 
been a breach of Community law at all, fulﬁ ls, therefore, much the 
same function in E.C. law as does the explicit usage of justiciability 
in the U.K. … The E.C.J.’s requirement that the rule of law infringed 
should be intended to confer rights on individuals could, without 
difﬁ culty, accommodate many of the issues which are presently con-
sidered under the heading of whether it is fair, just and reasonable 
to impose a duty of care.65 
In addition, the requirements of national law seem to be inapplicable 
in EU law because the State’s duty to comply with EU law is so wide that 
a relationship between the State and an individual would not be found 
to be proximate, nor would it be held that imposition of a duty would be 
fair, just and reasonable.66 
National law restrictions on the liability of public bodies should not 
be applicable in EU law. But it is important to note that EU law endorses 
comparable restrictions. The ﬁ rst restriction of liability, which excludes 
any general duty to protect from harm, conﬂ icts with the ﬁ rst condition 
of liability. If a provision of EU law conferred certain rights on individu-
als, then that right would have been upheld, and there would be no need 
to analyse whether a duty in national law existed or not. The second re-
striction, which relates to justiciability, conﬂ icts with the second condi-
tion of EU law. The discretionary power is given within EU law and based 
62  Booth and Squires (n 46) 13, 14, para 1.13.
63  Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] UKHL 3, 23.
64  Dugdale (ed) (n 32) paras 8-43, 8-49.
65  Craig (n 32) 93.
66  K Stanton and others, Statutory Torts (Sweet & Maxwell 2003) 262, para 6.065.
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on the public policy which serves EU law. Therefore, this restriction of 
national law is not applicable. The third restriction, relating to immunity 
from the negligence liability of public authorities, is not acceptable in EU 
law. The principle of Member State liability applies to all public authori-
ties and national public interest immunities are not applicable in these 
cases. Conditions of liability in EU law are the same for all, and the 
Court has indicated where they should be adapted to ﬁ t the function of 
judicial bodies. 
2) The standard of care - breach
National law does not have a deﬁ nitive concept of the standard of 
conduct which will give rise to liability. In situations where a margin 
of discretion is left by the statute, the breach of statutory duty will be 
fault-based. For example, if the statute uses the phrase ‘in so far as 
is reasonably practical’, the standard of care is then set in negligence 
or somewhere between negligence and strict liability.67 Indeed, civil law 
claims arising out of breaches of statutes may be conﬁ ned to the existing 
common law of negligence, eg where the breach of statutory duty is based 
on fault. The test of carelessness (from the common law of negligence) is 
then used.68
The national law standard of care in cases of breach of statutory 
duty may be reasonable care or an obligation to take reasonably practi-
cal action. The breach of a duty of care will arise where the conduct of 
the defendant is unreasonable in the sense that it falls below the ap-
propriate standard of care: ‘the standard of normally careful behaviour 
in the profession, occupation or activity in question.’69 This ﬂ exible test 
is adjustable to the particular circumstances of each case. ‘It is a ques-
tion of what courts think is a reasonable standard of care for society to 
enforce against its citizens through the mechanisms of tort law.’70 If the 
defendant’s conduct fell below the threshold set by this objective stand-
ard of care, the defendant acted unreasonably and a breach of duty oc-
curred. However, the tort of breach of statutory duty does not really have 
a single standard of breach. It has many of them. They can vary from 
absolute liability to close to negligence, which is why ‘they cannot serve 
as a model for torts built by analogy to them.’71 That is why in cases of 
Member State liability the standard of liability can be determined within 
67  Harpwood (n 51) 193-94.
68  RA Buckley, The Law of Negligence (4th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2005) 340, para 
16.08 and 351, para 16.31; see also Dugdale (ed) (n 32) para 9-55.
69  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 80.
70  P Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart Publishing 1997) 42.
71  Stanton (n 31) 332.
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the meaning of sufﬁ ciently serious breach as deﬁ ned by the Court.72 
The statute (breach of which gives rise to a statutory duty) will, in such 
cases, be that of EU law.
The standard of liability depends on the provisions of the relevant 
statute but also on the risks that ought to have been foreseen, and the 
probability of the occurrence of those risks and of harm as their conse-
quence.73 Risk refers to the chance, possibility or probability that some 
undesirable event will occur. Essentially it is all about the assessment 
of probabilities. Negligence is decided based on the balance between the 
value of the activity and the risk, and will be established if the conduct 
consists of imposing an unreasonable level of risk. The value or beneﬁ t 
of the activity is determined in the light of the interests of society. To 
conclude, the circumstances of each case are grouped according to three 
sets of criteria to help determine the level of care: objectivity; balancing 
of costs and beneﬁ ts; and community values and expectations. The level 
of care expected is that of an objective reasonable person.74 The balance 
between costs and beneﬁ ts is determined by asking whether the protec-
tion given to the claimant justiﬁ es (in terms of reasonableness) the cost 
incurred by the defendant. The common practice or reasonable expecta-
tions of the community inﬂ uence the judgement.75
Finally, before going on to EU law, one last emphasis should be made 
concerning national law. The parallel must be drawn between this ob-
jectively set standard of care and the defence of contributory negligence. 
The same objective standard of care that was applied here should be 
applied at the level of contributory negligence when analysing whether a 
claimant has failed to take reasonable care of his own interests so as to 
justify a reduction in damages.76
In Member State liability cases, the individual will have the right to 
reparation of loss if the breach of EU law was sufﬁ ciently serious (among 
other conditions of liability). In Brasserie, the Court determined the test 
for the expected standard of conduct in an area where the Member State 
has wide discretion. The degree of discretion is not always the same, but 
the greater it is, the greater the chance that the breach will not be suf-
72  Craig (n 37) 884-85.
73  Booth and Squires (n 46) 230, para 5.02.
74  If, exceptionally, extraordinary unreasonableness is required as a standard of care, the 
judge asks if the defendant acted so unreasonably that no reasonable authority could have 
acted in this way. This creates a higher threshold in comparison to ordinary unreasonable-
ness where, in the courts view, the majority of people qualiﬁ ed to have an opinion on the 
matter would consider certain conduct as unreasonable even though some might see it as 
reasonable. See Cane (n 70) 41, 55.
75  Dugdale (n 14) 17-18; Cane (n 70) 42, 44-45.
76  Dugdale (ed) (n 32) para 8-130.
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ﬁ ciently serious.77 This condition is a form of fault liability deﬁ ned within 
EU law. Indeed, it includes certain objective and subjective factors con-
nected with the concept of fault in various national legal systems, but it 
depends on the goals and purposes of the EU. That is why the reparation 
of loss or damage caused to individuals by a Member State cannot be 
dependent on any national concept of fault going beyond that of a suf-
ﬁ ciently serious breach of EU law.78 National courts have to adapt exami-
nation of Member State liability cases accordingly.
A practical example of analysis of this condition may be found in 
the British Telecommunications79 case, where the national court posed a 
preliminary question concerning an incorrectly implemented directive in 
UK law. The Court had enough facts to determine the sufﬁ cient serious-
ness of the breach of EU law. The analysis of the factors of sufﬁ ciently 
serious breach revealed that the directive was: 
imprecisely worded and was reasonably capable of bearing … the 
interpretation given to it by the United Kingdom in good faith… That 
interpretation, which was also shared by other Member States, was 
not manifestly contrary to the wording of the directive or to the ob-
jective pursued by it. Moreover, no guidance was available to the 
United Kingdom from case law of the Court as to the interpretation 
of the provision at issue, nor did the Commission raise the matter 
when the 1992 Regulations were adopted.80
The Court showed how to apply the factors of sufﬁ ciently serious 
breach to the speciﬁ c circumstances of the case in order to determine 
whether a breach had occurred. National courts followed the Court in 
later cases of Member State liability.
National courts adopted the condition of sufﬁ ciently serious breach 
as a set standard of expected conduct of the State within EU law. They set 
national concepts of fault, such as carelessness and negligence, aside. In 
R v Department of Social Security Ex p Scullion, the national court decided 
that the State was liable in damages for breach of EU law due to the failure 
to implement the Equal Treatment Directive. The national court decided to 
‘adopt a basket or global approach weighing the various factors’81 of sufﬁ -
ciently serious breach suggested by the Court in Brasserie. The breach was 
therefore found to be sufﬁ ciently serious to give rise to state liability.82
77  Stanton and others (n 66) 242, para 6.036.
78  Brasserie (n 2) paras 75-80.
79  Case C-392/93 British Telecommunications [1996] ECR I-1631.
80  British Telecommunications (n 79) paras 43-44.
81  R v Department of Social Security Ex p Scullion [1999] 3 CMLR 798 QBD 814, para 43.
82  The national court considered ﬁ ve factors in the assessment of the sufﬁ cient seriousness 
of the breach: (1) the clarity of the relevant Directive; (2) the Government not seeking legal 
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In Factortame (No5),83 Lord Clyde considered the factors of serious 
breach given by the Court in Brasserie84 but analysed them more thor-
oughly. He said that one single factor may or may not be decisive for the 
existence of a sufﬁ ciently serious breach. Nevertheless, it may be con-
cluded that the behaviour of the State was particularly grave based on 
one factor so serious that it justiﬁ ed establishment of liability. His very 
thorough analysis gives an excellent example of the application of Member 
State liability conditions by national courts. The judge used the factors of 
sufﬁ ciently serious breach as suggested by the Court, but even where he 
added new factors he did so within the aims and purpose of EU law.85
advice; (3) the principle of equal treatment which was breached was of fundamental impor-
tance; (4) the fact that particularly vulnerable members of society were gravely affected had 
been foreseen by the Government; (5) the absence of consultation with the EU Commission 
despite the views of the Commission and the judgments of the Court of Justice indicating 
that the rules on entitlement to ICA were discriminatory. See R v Department of Social Secu-
rity Ex p Scullion (n 81) Sullivan J, 799-800.
83  In this case, the State appealed to the House of Lords who had to determine whether the 
State’s breach of EU law was sufﬁ ciently serious to give rise under EU law to the right to 
compensatory damages. See R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No5) 
[1999] 3 WLR 1062.
84  ‘The factors which the competent court may take into consideration include the clarity 
and precision of the rule breached, the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national 
or Community authorities, whether the infringement and the damage caused was inten-
tional or involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the fact that 
the position taken by a Community institution may have contributed towards the omission, 
and the adoption or retention of national measures or practices contrary to Community 
law.’ See Brasserie (n 2) para 56.
85  ‘Some of those factors can be identiﬁ ed as follows.
1… the nature of the breach. [This may relate to] the importance of the principle which has 
been breached … or …
2. … the clarity and precision of the rule breached. If the breach is of a provision of Com-
munity law which is not framed in clear language and is readily open to construction, 
then the breach may be the less serious. Questions of the clarity of the rule may require 
to be associated with questions of the complexity of the factual situation. The application 
to complex facts even of a rule which is reasonably clear in itself may render the situation 
open to doubt.
3. … the degree of excusability of an error of law. That could arise on account of the ambigu-
ity of a Community text. It could also arise out of the uncertainty of the law in some particu-
lar area, where there is little or no guidance and evident room for difference of opinion.
4. Another factor relating to the clarity of the law is the existence of any relevant judgment 
of the court on the point. If there is settled case law, the failure to follow it may add to the 
seriousness of the breach. On the other hand if the point is novel and is not covered by any 
guidance from the court then liability should less readily follow.
5. … the state of mind of the infringer, and in particular whether the infringer was acting 
intentionally or involuntarily. A deliberate intention to infringe would obviously weigh heav-
ily in the scales of seriousness. An inadvertent breach might be relatively less serious on 
that account …
6. The behaviour of the infringer after it has become evident that an infringement has oc-
curred may also be of importance. At the one extreme the immediate taking of steps to 
undo what has been done and correct any error which has been committed may operate to 
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To conclude, the Court gave an initial list of factors for the assess-
ment of breach in Brasserie.86 The list is not exhaustive and it serves to 
provide guidance to the national court. However, this does not mean that 
national courts are free to use their national factors of fault or careless-
ness which they use in national law to determine blameworthiness of 
conduct. National concepts of fault and consequently the policies behind 
them are excluded from application in Member State liability cases. Fac-
tors of breach which are used for assessment of the degree of seriousness 
always have to relate to EU law and reﬂ ect its policies. Lord Clyde’s elabo-
ration of factors of breach clearly supports this view, particularly when 
he explained the factor of intentional or involuntary behaviour. He said 
that ‘the purpose of the infringer should be considered. If the purpose 
was to advance the interests of the Community, a breach committed with 
that end in view might be seen as less serious than one committed with 
the purpose of serving merely national interests.’87 In cases involving EU 
law, national judges should put their ‘EU shoes’ on and regard similar 
situations differently than in purely national law. 
Opposing views exist regarding the use of national law in establish-
ing the existence of the sufﬁ ciently serious breach condition. With regard 
to opposing views, an interesting decision was made recently in a case 
of sufﬁ ciently serious judicial breach of EU law. In Cooper v HM Attorney 
General, the court refused to exclude purely national factors from ex-
mitigate the seriousness of the breach. At the other extreme a persistence in the breach, the 
retention of measures or practices which are contrary to Community law, especially where 
they are known so to be, will add to the seriousness of what has been done. Indeed, in para-
graph 37 of the judgment in Factortame III the court stated that persistence in a breach 
despite a judgment ﬁ nding an infringement or clear case-law on the point, “will clearly be 
sufﬁ ciently serious.”
7. Another aspect relates to the identity of the persons affected by the breach …
8. A further consideration is the position taken by one of the Community institutions in 
the matter. It may be that one of the institutions has … “contributed towards the omis-
sion:” … In the present context this is not to be seen as bearing upon the third of the three 
necessary conditions for liability which the court has prescribed, namely the existence of a 
direct causal link between the breach and the damages sustained. Here it is a factor relat-
ing to the seriousness of the breach. … [I]t is presented as a mitigating factor and it is wide 
enough to include various kinds of actions on the part of the institution concerned. But 
it also includes the giving of information or advice and in that connection the factor could 
operate in either direction so far as the seriousness of the breach is concerned. Advice from 
the Commission that the state would not be acting in breach of Community law in taking 
a particular step would plainly be a mitigating factor. The decision to persist in a proposed 
step in the face of warnings from the Commission that the state would be in breach of Com-
munity law in so doing would add to the seriousness of the State’s action.
What then remains is the application of the test to the facts of the case.’ See R v Secretary 
of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (n 83).
86  Brasserie (n 2) para 56.
87  R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (n 83).
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amination of the breach. Arden LJ held that these national factors also 
include the facts of the case, and if these were excluded, the issues would 
then have to be decided in a ‘factual vacuum’.88 The existence of a suf-
ﬁ ciently serious breach should not be viewed in such a factual vacuum 
or by completely excluding national law. It is true that the facts of the 
case are relevant and sometimes can include national legal decisions. 
However, the use of national legal concepts should not reverse the effect 
of EU law. This could cause a distortion and different application of EU 
law across Member States. The same judge also held that domestic law 
is the lens through which EU law should be viewed, but this is question-
able. If that would mean that national interests and policies should be 
put ﬁ rst, then this would be completely unacceptable for EU law. In fact, 
it is quite hard to understand how English law could serve as a lens to 
view EU law when they so profoundly differ in basic concepts such as 
torts and rights.
The judgements of the High Court and the House of Lords are im-
portant in many ways. They show that in Member State liability cases 
national courts must disregard national law and apply EU law. It is also 
clear that the liability of Member States depends primarily on the condi-
tions stipulated by the Court. The particular analysis of the condition of 
sufﬁ ciently serious breach also shows that it is determined by EU law, 
and that the factors used for its establishment are those determined by 
the Court. What this means is that not only national factors of fault are 
excluded from application in Member State liability cases but also all 
national policy reasons behind them. National law may protect the State 
from liability towards individuals due to various national policy reasons 
(opening a ﬂ oodgate of claims which would burden the courts, protection 
of national ﬁ nances, freedom of the State to perform the tasks within its 
competence without fear of liability, etc), but this is not a part of EU law. 
To conclude, the conditions of Member State liability should be consist-
ently applied so that supplementary conditions of national law would not 
be imposed in such a way that they call into question the right to repara-
tion founded on the EU legal order. 
88  ‘[W]hen the court is considering whether a breach is manifest, or sufﬁ ciently serious, the 
court is not restricted to asking itself whether there was a clear infringement of the case-
law of the Court of Justice. It is able to look at all the relevant considerations. One of those 
factors indeed includes whether the breach was intentional, by which what must be meant 
is that it was deliberately intended to cause a breach of Community law. In dealing with 
that point, it is relevant to consider whether the court’s decision was in accordance with 
other decisions in its domestic law. Domestic case law will in particular carry weight where 
it purports to interpret and apply the relevant Community law … [D]omestic law is the lens 
through which the national judge sees Community law and if the Court of Justice had in-
tended that any such consideration should be excluded, it would in our judgment have said 
so. Moreover, even if domestic decisions were not relevant, we would have reached the same 
answer.’ See Cooper v HM Attorney General [2010] EWCA Civ 464, paras 73, 111, 123.
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 Finally, those factors which in national law are used to determine 
fault (the standard of care within the tort of negligence) are also used 
to determine legal causation. Hence, if in a Member State liability case 
national factors of fault are excluded at the level of sufﬁ ciently serious 
breach, they should also be excluded at the level of causation. This leads 
us to the issue of causation, which will be examined below.
C) Breach per se or strict liability - ‘pure’ tort of breach of 
statutory duty
The tort of breach of statutory duty is usually referred to as the 
strict liability tort in English law. However, this does not always describe 
absolute or no fault liability.89 The general principle of no fault liability 
does not exist in common law, but is relatively frequently provided for by 
statute. The basic principle here is that Parliament, by means of a stat-
ute intended to create a private cause of action, protects a limited class of 
individuals. The basis of liability depends on precise stipulation in each 
statute, because they are never applied by analogy. The elements of strict 
liability are: the conduct which creates the risk of injury; materialisa-
tion of the risk; and the injury (damage) caused by this materialisation 
of the risk. The risk theory in English law is based on strict liability. Its 
purpose is the protection of certain individuals who suffer harm. This is 
for the overall beneﬁ t of society.90 
The tort of breach of statutory duty is based on strict liability if the 
mere breach of a provision of the statute is enough for a right of action in 
tort to be recognised. In other words, if the rule deﬁ nes an obligation to 
reach a certain result, liability is strict. The relevant statute deﬁ nes the 
standard of breach which is required for liability to be incurred. Conse-
quently, this also determines the test to be used in a causal inquiry. This 
will be discussed below.
In the Scullion case, which concerned EU law, the national court 
held that ‘a breach can be “manifest and grave” so as to make it suf-
ﬁ ciently serious without it being intentional or negligent.’91 This shows 
that national courts accepted strict liability (in the absolute sense) in 
Member State liability cases. The category of the breach of statutory duty 
simpliciter seems to be a breach based on strict liability. Hence, it satis-
ﬁ es the strict liability limb (or the second limb) of Member State liability 
for breach of EU law. This case is similar to Rechberger,92 where EU law 
89  Stanton (n 31) 331.
90  Walton, Cooper and Wood (n 28) 839, para 11-06; T Weir, An Introduction to Tort Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2006) 91, 93, 937.
91  Scullion (n 81) para 65.
92  C-140/97 Walter Rechberger v Austria [1999] ECR I-3499.
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imposed on a Member State a strict obligation of result. The national rule 
that a statute has to create such a right of action is rendered meaning-
less, because in that respect EU law takes over and guarantees a remedy 
in damages if all the requirements of EU law are met. The condition of 
national law which seeks the protection of a limited class of individu-
als is also irrelevant in a case of EU law, because the ﬁ rst condition of 
the Member State liability principle states that ‘the rule of law infringed 
must be intended to confer rights on individuals’.93 That is, if the relevant 
rule of EU law intends to confer rights on individuals, the remedy exists. 
Hence, a national judge will apply the tort of breach of statutory duty 
simpliciter as a basis for a claim for Member State liability in damages if 
the basis of liability is strict. The substantive conditions of existence of 
the remedy are those determined by EU law. To conclude, the question in 
this tort is always one of statutory construction. However, when EU law 
is involved, then it is EU law statutory construction that is examined.
D) Causation if liability is based on fault
In English law, the term causation is sometimes used to describe only 
cause in fact, not legal causation. Remoteness often deﬁ nes legal cause. 
The issue of causation in the tort of breach of statutory duty in national 
law is regulated by the same rules as used in the tort of negligence.94 In 
this sense, Lord Reid stated ‘I can ﬁ nd neither reason nor authority for 
the rule being different where there is breach of a statutory duty.’95 Even 
if there is doubt in the meaning of the term, ‘the test of losses which are 
too remote in respect of breach of statutory duty is the same as the test for 
negligence.’96 On the contrary, some authors evoke the national condition 
of the breach of statutory duty relating to the intention of Parliament to 
deﬁ ne the interest to be protected by the statute, and consider that this ef-
fectively resolves issues which might be deemed remoteness of damage in 
other contexts.97 However, in a case involving EU law, this condition would 
be replaced by the establishment of the ﬁ rst condition of liability. It is the 
scope of the norm of EU law which confers the right on individuals which 
deﬁ nes the interest to be protected by the statute. The issue of causation 
has developed mostly within the tort of negligence. Hence, this article will 
mostly, but not exclusively, concentrate on this tort.
93  Brasserie (n 2) para 51.
94  Harpwood (n 51) 169.
95  Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613; for the same reasoning see also Fair-
child v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32; see also Holtby v Brigham & Cowan 
(Hull) Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ 111.
96  T Downes, ‘Trawling for a Remedy: State Liability under Community Law’(2006) 17 Legal 
Studies 286, 301.
97  Stanton (n 31) 339.
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 English tort law routinely analyses causation in two stages. Re Po-
lemis98 was considered the authority on factual causation. However, this 
causal test changed in Wagon Mound (No 1), when the test of remoteness 
of damage was also required for liability to be determined.99 The ﬁ rst 
stage is factual causation or the ‘but-for cause’, which is concerned with 
the question of ‘whether the defendant’s fault was a necessary condi-
tion of loss occurring.’100 The ﬁ rst part of causal inquiry relies heavily 
on the facts of the case. It is crucial to prove the existence of damage 
and whether the breach of the defendant’s duty was the cause of it. If it 
was, the causal inquiry generally proceeds to the second stage, where 
the judge determines the legal cause of loss by assessing whether the 
link between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting damage was suf-
ﬁ ciently close. If the damage was so remote that the defendant could not 
have foreseen the occurrence of such a particular kind of damage, he 
will not be held liable. That is, the concept of foresight arises particularly 
in relation to the duty of care and the breach of duty of care.101
However, ultimately it is the law that deﬁ nes causation. More pre-
cisely, the particular rules which deﬁ ne liability also shape the issue of 
causation in each particular case. As Lord Hoffman explained: 
in what sense is causation a question of fact? In order to describe 
something as a question of fact, it is necessary to be able to identify 
the question. For example, whether someone was negligent or not 
is a question of fact. What is the question? It is whether he failed 
to take reasonable care to avoid such damage as a reasonable man 
would have foreseen might result from his conduct. That question 
is formulated by the law. It is the law which says that failure to take 
reasonable care gives rise to liability. And the question is then an-
swered by applying the standard of conduct prescribed by the law to 
the facts.102 
Therefore, the particular framework of legal rules that regulates a 
certain situation also deﬁ nes causation. Deakin and others consider that 
‘[i]n a doctrinal sense, it is impossible to write about causation without 
acknowledging that inherent in the law’s account of causation is also a 
view of what constitutes fault.’103
98  In Re Arbitration between Polemis and Furness Withy Co [1921] 3 KB 560.
99  Wagon Mound [1961] UKPC 1 [1961] AC 388.
100  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 185.
101  Harpwood (n 51) 24; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 185.
102  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd (n 95) para 51.
103  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 188.
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The problems relating to causation are complex and difﬁ cult, be-
cause the meaning of the term causation is not uniﬁ ed in law. In addi-
tion, many elements that are not strictly connected with the meaning 
of causation enter the ﬁ nal decisions of the courts. In law, there is also 
the issue of deﬁ ning which harm is reparable and the type of causal 
connection. The type of reparable harm is usually determined by the 
relevant rule of EU law that is breached, and involves legal policy. The 
type of causal connection relates to the causal theories used. These are 
the theory of causa sine qua non, or the but-for cause, and the adequacy 
theory. The said theories are used in the English legal system and indi-
cated in the case law of the Court. The determination of both harm and 
causal connection involves the scope, purpose and legal policy of legal 
rules. These are not strictly causal issues but are usually dealt with un-
der causation.
Rules which shape and deﬁ ne Member State liability are rules of EU 
law, and these same rules have to determine the issue of causation as 
well. Causal rules in English law consist of substantive and procedural 
ones. They are heavily intertwined, which otherwise would not be a prob-
lem but for the application of EU law. Member States enjoy the princi-
ple of procedural autonomy, while EU law, to a certain extent, deﬁ nes 
substantive rules. Hence, national judges are left with a difﬁ cult task of 
disentangling one from the other. The Court said that regarding causa-
tion ‘it is for the national courts to determine whether there is a direct 
causal link between the breach of the obligation borne by the State and 
the damage sustained by the injured parties.’104 What does this mean in 
practice? Andenas and Fairgrieve say that causation, the same as the 
other conditions of liability for breach of EU law, is primarily determined 
by EU law, while national rules of causation which do not provide an 
effective standard of protection within EU law will be discarded.105 How-
ever, causal requirements vary depending on the basis and purpose of 
liability, to use the words of Lord Hoffmann quoted below. The basis and 
purpose of Member State liability is found in EU law. These questions 
cannot be separated, and that is why national rules, at least substantive 
ones, on causation are inapplicable. In other words, national procedural 
rules on causation should be applied by respecting the basis and pur-
pose of Member State liability in EU law. ‘One is never simply liable; one 
is always liable for something and the rules which determine what one 
is liable for are as much part of the substantive law as the rules which 
104  Brasserie (n 2) para 65.
105  M Andenas and D Fairgrieve, ‘Misfeasance in Public Ofﬁ ce, Governmental Liability, and 
European Inﬂ uences’ (2002) 51(4) ICLQ 757, 774.
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determine which acts give rise to liability.’106 By analogy, rules which 
determine what one is liable for in EU law are set within the ﬁ rst and 
second conditions of the Member State liability principle and together 
form a part of the third condition: direct causal link. If rights that EU 
law confers on individuals are breached in a manner that is sufﬁ ciently 
serious, the standard of behaviour that is set will inevitably inﬂ uence 
causal inquiry as well. 
A Member State liability claim may be based on fault liability (suf-
ﬁ ciently serious breach) or strict liability (breach per se). The ﬁ rst form of 
liability analyses the conduct of the defendant and considers his blame-
worthiness through factors of serious breach. The second form of liabil-
ity is based on the obligation of result stipulated in a norm, where failure 
to reach it triggers liability. These two forms of liability depend on the 
relevant legislative texts. If a rule of EU law leaves a certain margin of 
discretion to the Member State, liability will be analysed through fault 
factors. However, if the rule puts an obligation of result upon that State, 
liability will be strict. Consequently, causal inquiry has to be adjusted. 
In the ﬁ rst case, causal inquiry will consist of two steps: factual and legal 
causation. In the second case, this inquiry will stop at factual causation, 
because legal causation is irrelevant. In English law, the tort of breach of 
statutory duty is normally considered as a strict liability tort, where only 
factual causation is relevant. If liability is fault-based, causal inquiry 
resembles that in the tort of negligence. In the words of Lord Reid: 
[a] plaintiff must prove not only negligence or breach of duty but also 
that such fault caused or materially contributed to his injury, and 
there is ample authority for that proposition both in Scotland and in 
England. I can ﬁ nd neither reason nor authority for the rule being 
different where there is breach of a statutory duty.107
1) Factual causation 
In national law, factual causation must be proven ﬁ rst. This means 
that an unbroken chain of consequences between the defendant’s con-
duct and the injury must be shown.108 There are, naturally, exceptions 
to the general rule, but they are rare.109 The ‘but-for’ test helps in estab-
106  Lord Hoffmann in Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Company and Others 
[2002] 2 AC 883, para 128.
107  Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw (n 95). For the same reasoning, see also Fairchild v 
Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd (n 95); Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd (n 95).
108  There are exceptions to this rule. Eg in cases where multiple tortfeasors are involved, 
this test breaks down. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 186.
109  This would be the case where the burden of proof is shifted onto the creator of the risk. 
See McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1. There is also the exception of super-
395CYELP 8 [2012] 369-410
lishing the relevant chain by asking: but for the defendant’s act would 
the damage have occurred? If on the balance of probabilities it is likely 
that it would have occurred anyway, then the defendant’s act is not con-
sidered as the cause of damage. If the answer is no, the defendant’s con-
duct is considered as a factual cause.110 The evidence must show that it 
was more likely than not that the defendant’s conduct caused damage. 
Generally, the claimant has the burden of proof, while in some excep-
tional cases judges may use reasons of policy and fairness to conclude 
that the defendant’s conduct increased the risk of damage and can thus 
be treated as proof of causality.111 In national law ‘[t]he question of fact 
is whether the causal requirements which the law lays down for that 
particular liability have been satisﬁ ed. But those requirements exist by 
virtue of rules of law.’112 
In Gallagher, which involved the application of EU law, the Court of 
Appeal reached only the level of factual causation. The claimant could 
not show on the balance of probabilities that his lost chance was caused 
by a breach of the State. The national court applied this causal test by 
comparison to the national causal test used in the tort of negligence but 
with necessary changes for the purposes of EU law. More precisely, the 
court said that ‘Mr Gallagher has established a breach of Community 
law, but he could not show that that breach probably caused him to be 
excluded from the United Kingdom when he would not otherwise have 
been excluded.’113 Hence, the court did not use just any act, but speciﬁ -
cally the act to which the element of sufﬁ ciently serious breach of EU law 
applied. Further limitation to legal causes was irrelevant.
Before one can answer the question of fact, one must ﬁ rst formu-
late the question. This involves deciding what, in the circumstances 
of the particular case, the law’s requirements are. Unless one pays 
attention to the need to determine this preliminary question, the 
proposition that causation is a question of fact may be misleading. It 
may suggest that one somehow knows instinctively what the ques-
tion is or that the question is always the same. As we shall see, 
this is not the case. The causal requirements for liability often vary, 
sometimes quite subtly, from case to case. And since the causal re-
quirements for liability are always a matter of law, these variations 
vening or overtaking causes, where the direct chain of consequences inevitably breaks. In 
such cases, joint tortfeasors are held jointly and severally liable to the victim. See Deakin, 
Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 192-94.
110  Dugdale (n 14) 70. See also Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1988] UKHL 
1. 
111  Dugdale (ed) (n 32) para 2-06.
112  Lord Hofmann in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd (n 95) para 52.
113  Gallagher [1996] 2 CMLR 951, 965.
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represent legal differences, driven by the recognition that the just 
solution to different kinds of case may require different causal re-
quirement rules.114
If we apply this reasoning by analogy to EU law, it is the law that 
formulates the question. The question for the test of factual causation 
would thus be: would the damage have occurred but for the sufﬁ ciently seri-
ous breach of the defendant? The test applies the standard of conduct set 
within EU law and not any concept of fault, carelessness or negligence. 
In conclusion, the third condition of the Member State liability prin-
ciple which determines the issue of direct causal link is a rule of law, 
and is a constitutive part of the conditions of liability. It is not a question 
of fact (not exclusively at least). It cannot be established based on judi-
cial intuition, a sense of logic or justice. Causal inquiry in such cases 
is determined by EU law, and national judges should disregard national 
causal rules which would introduce national liability requirements into 
a Member State liability case, unless they would offer a higher meas-
ure of protection to the individual. However, national causal procedural 
rules are relevant as they help determine the steps of causal inquiry. 
Therefore, the two-step procedure of causal analysis used in English law 
will be described further, as it is relevant for the application of EU law. 
2) Legal causation
The law has three rules for narrowing down a defendant’s liability: 
‘rules of remoteness, intervention and purpose.’115 Remoteness or foresee-
ability will be dealt with ﬁ rst, as it is particularly important in liability 
based on negligence or fault. Breaking of the causal chain due to inter-
vening causes will be brieﬂ y mentioned as part of the inquiry into legal 
causes. Risk or the protective scope of the norm will be treated within 
the context of strict liability, ie liability without proof of fault. 
a) Foreseeability or remoteness
When the cause in fact is determined, there still remains the ques-
tion of whether the link between the defendant’s conduct and the result-
ing damage was sufﬁ ciently close.116 This step of causal inquiry is also 
referred to as the direct, proximate, foreseeable or remote cause to de-
scribe the relationship between conduct and loss. It is used for the tort of 
negligence, but also for the tort of breach of statutory duty. 
114  Lord Hofmann in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd (n 95) para 52.
115  Weir (n 90) 82.
116  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 185.
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The expression ‘foreseeability’ is commonly used in everyday life to 
describe some moral standard of responsibility such as the standard of 
a reasonable man. This term is also used by legal practitioners in order 
to establish the causal link between the breach of a rule and damage. 
National judges deﬁ ne ‘foreseeability’ in their judgments.117 Such deﬁ ni-
tions are then applied by analogy to all other cases. The test on reasona-
ble foreseeability within the context of remoteness is based on the judge’s 
perception that an individual should or should not be made liable in tort 
for damage.118 Foreseeability is primarily important in order to establish 
negligence or fault, but it is also relevant for determining the extent of 
the tortfeasor’s liability. Extent refers here to the consequences of the ini-
tial harm and the duty of the tortfeasor to repair the resulting loss.119
The test of remoteness in fault-based cases is the scope of reason-
able foreseeability. The Privy Council introduced this test in the Wagon 
Mound (No 1) decision.120 In cases of economic loss, the scope of duty also 
functions as the remoteness limit on recovery if the duty of care relates 
to economic loss.121 The kind of damage should have been reasonably 
foreseeable to the defendant. If it was not, it is judged too remote and cau-
sality is not established. Damage is deemed too remote if ‘it is not of the 
same type as would normally be anticipated in similar circumstances, 
or if it occurred in an unusual way.’122 In the case of breach of statutory 
duty, the intention of the legislator to protect the type of interest harmed 
must be established, which makes the ﬁ nding of foreseeability of damage 
even simpler.123 In other words, this conﬁ rms that the type or class of 
harm may be determined by reference to rules which designate certain 
conduct as negligent. Fault factors set the expected standard of conduct 
(which is relevant for determining negligence) but can also be used to 
establish whether a certain type of harm could have been foreseeable.124 
Finally, the kind of damage can be stretched or shrunk, depending on 
policy considerations.125
117  This is also the case in all other legal systems. Causality is very rarely referred to in 
statutes because of its elusive character, and then if it is, the reference is very general. 
118  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 187.
119  See Hart and Honoré (n 4) 255.
120  Wagon Mound [1961] UKPC 1 [1961] AC 388.
121  Dugdale (n 14) 75, 77, 78, 80.
122  Dugdale (ed) (n 32) para 2-107.
123  Downes (n 96) 301.
124  Hart and Honoré (n 4) 257-58.
125  For example, in cases of physical harm the test is less strict and asks for foreseeability 
of any physical harm. Not so for property loss or pure economic loss, where that speciﬁ c 
harm must be foreseeable. There exist variations of this view. See Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis (n 20) 210, 212.
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The issue of remoteness is particularly signiﬁ cant in the presence of 
fault liability, because it establishes the relationship between the degree 
of fault and damage. The defendant will not be held liable for extreme-
ly unusual consequences of his acts, because the relationship between 
fault and damage would be disproportionate. That is, negligence (or the 
expected standard of conduct) inﬂ uences causality because once negli-
gence (or the breach of that standard) has been established, consequenc-
es have to be quite exceptional for liability not to be recognised.126
Foreseeability can be assessed in terms of a narrower or wider 
view. If the narrower view is adopted, foreseeability of harm is measured 
only in as much as it is needed to establish negligence, in other words, 
whether the harm caused is of the type which falls under the protective 
scope of the norm violated. That is, whether the right to reparation ex-
ists. Here, culpability for harm and compensation for the damage which 
ensued are separated. If, on the other hand, the wider view is adopted (in 
England it was as of 1961),127 culpability and compensation are assessed 
based on the same test. In this instance, the only relevant causal ques-
tion is whether the defendant’s act was a necessary condition of damage 
- whether the defendant could reasonably have foreseen and prevent-
ed harm. This wider view regulates more closely the establishment of a 
causal link. The rule is at the same time limiting and extending in terms 
of liability, which means it is much more precise. It is limiting in that it 
determines on one hand that a defendant is not liable for harm that he 
could not have foreseen. On the other hand, it is extending in that it ex-
tends the defendant’s liability to only that harm which was necessarily 
caused by his act. Thus, in such a view, the causal rules are much more 
deﬁ nite and less is left to the judges’ intuition.128 
Two years after Wagon Mound (No 1),129 the House of Lords decided 
on Hughes v Lord Advocate130 and extended the scope of liability in say-
ing that if the accident is of a different kind and type from anything the 
defendant could have foreseen, he will not be held liable for it. Thus, what 
needs to be foreseeable is the type of harm not the manner in which it 
occurs.
‘The courts appear to be using (or possibly misusing) the language 
of cause to decide (yet again) questions of policy, such as … which out-
come will best promote loss prevention in that context in the future.’131 
126  Weir (n 90) 83.
127  Wagon Mound (n 120).
128  Hart and Honoré (n 4) 256.
129  Wagon Mound (n 120).
130  Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] UKHL 8.
131  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 185.
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These policies include the search for an economically efﬁ cient framework 
of liability, and systems of loss shifting or loss spreading which reﬂ ect 
national social values and concerns about allocations of risk and re-
sponsibilities.132 The law imposes certain obligations based on the legal 
policy behind them and causal inquiry should be shaped accordingly. 
There is a ﬁ ne line between general causal rules and policy reasons, and 
a right balance must be struck in each case based on the particular cir-
cumstances. To illustrate, in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd, 
Lord Hoffmann said ‘I think it would be both inconsistent with the policy 
of the law imposing the duty and morally wrong for your Lordships to im-
pose causal requirements which exclude liability.’133 Hence, causal inquiry 
was shaped based on the breach of duty imposed by the statute and the 
policy behind the creation of such a duty.
There are differences and similarities in proving the existence of 
duty, the breach of it, and legal causation. Denning LJ observed in Roe 
v Minister of Health that 
the three questions, duty, causation, and remoteness, run continu-
ally into one another. It seems to me that they are simply three dif-
ferent ways of looking at one and the same question which is this: Is 
the consequence fairly to be regarded as within the risk created by 
the negligence.134 
In the tort of negligence, the duty of care requirement overlaps with 
remoteness of damage. Foreseeability is a factor considered in relation 
to the duty of care, the breach of the duty of care and again in causal 
inquiry when establishing the legal cause of damage.135 Lord Hoffmann 
explained his reasoning of this problem:
The concepts of fairness, justice and reason underlie the rules which 
state the causal requirements of liability for a particular form of con-
duct (or non-causal limits on that liability) just as much as they 
underlie the rules which determine that conduct to be tortious. And 
the two are inextricably linked together: the purpose of the causal 
requirement rules is to produce a just result by delimiting the scope 
of liability in a way which relates to the reasons why liability for the 
conduct in question exists in the ﬁ rst place.136 
132  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 188.
133  This was a case where the damage concerned death, and in such cases courts are al-
ways more likely to recognise liability than in damage to property. The claimants contracted 
lung cancer (mesothelioma) due to inhalation of asbestos ﬁ bre and consequently fell gravely 
ill or died. See Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd (n 95) para 63, emphasis added. 
134  Denning LJ in Roe v Minister of Health [1954] EWCA Civ 7.
135  Dugdale (ed) (n 32) paras 2-107 and 2-108; Weir (n 90) 83; Harpwood (n 51) 24.
136  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd (n 95) para 56.
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The very important factor of foreseeability thus draws a connect-
ing line through the entire tort of negligence.137 The standard of care is 
the primary element that deﬁ nes causation.138 ‘The question of causa-
tion cannot be divorced from that of duty. The policy underlying the 
duty may inﬂ uence the application of causation principles.’139 Culpability 
and compensation are assessed based on the same test.140 When assess-
ing breach, the judges are expected to determine the risk and thereby 
come to a conclusion on the negligence of the conduct. Risk refers to the 
chance, possibility or probability that some undesirable event will occur 
in the future. These factors of risk are assessed by reference to an objec-
tive standard, a reasonable person. On the other hand, within causal 
inquiry, these same factors of chance, possibility, and probability con-
stitute the requirement of foreseeability. But in this case, they relate to 
the present case, not some objectively created standard. As Deakin and 
Markesinis conclude, ‘the test of foreseeability of damage is no more con-
clusive in regard to causation than it is as a test for duty and breach’.141 
In the case of EU law, the situation should be the following. Legally 
relevant causes are determined in the second step of causal inquiry. 
The test of reasonable foreseeability is used in national law and may 
be adjusted to ﬁ t EU law as well. The test of reasonable foreseeability 
considers whether the kind of damage that occurred was a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence to the defendant Member State. The national 
judge should anticipate similar circumstances and consider whether the 
damage is of the same type as would normally be expected. If it is not, 
it will be deemed too remote. The ‘kind’ of damage can be stretched or 
shrunk, depending on policy considerations. The policy considerations 
used should be those of EU law. 
To draw a parallel between national and EU law, if in English law 
‘[t]he question of causation cannot be divorced from that of duty [and 
the] policy underlying the duty may inﬂ uence the application of causa-
tion principles’,142 then this affects EU law as well. National policies are 
a result of national social values and concerns about allocations of risk 
and responsibilities.143 However, these do not necessarily mirror the al-
locations of risk and responsibilities in EU law. In fact, it is very hard to 
imagine how a supranational entity uniting numerous Member States 
137  H McGregor QC, McGregor on Damages (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) para 4-002.
138  Harpwood (n 51) 193-94.
139  Dugdale (ed) (n 32) para 8-11.
140  Hart and Honoré (n 4) 256.
141  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 188.
142  Dugdale (ed) (n 32) para 8-11.
143  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 20) 188.
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could have the same concerns about allocations of risk and responsibili-
ties as each of its individual nations. One of the purposes of the Member 
State liability principle is to make Member States respect EU law and the 
individual rights given by that law to their citizens. Certainly, Member 
States would not have this anywhere on their own national agenda. The 
policies of EU law are shaped around its own social values and concerns 
about allocations of risk and responsibilities. Therefore, causal rules ap-
plicable in EU law should mirror the policies of EU law.
In cases of Member State liability, whether they are based on the 
tort of breach of statutory duty or Eurotort, national conditions of duty 
and breach of duty are replaced by conditions of conferment of rights on 
individuals and sufﬁ cient seriousness of breach, all of which are gov-
erned by EU law. In the context of EU law, ‘the duty may be described 
in general terms as a duty not to act in grave and manifest disregard of 
[EC law] obligations.’144 Hence, sufﬁ ciently serious breach inﬂ uences the 
establishment of causality. Factors indicating the existence of serious 
breach in EU law are also factors indicating the existence of causation:
- if the Member State acted with intention to breach EU law, this 
was one of the factors that caused harm;
- if the Member State acted outside of its discretion given by EU 
law, this was one of the factors that caused harm;
- if the error committed by the Member State was inexcusable, this 
was one of the factors that caused harm;
- if the Member State failed to abandon national measures con-
trary to EU law, that was one of the factors that caused harm.
Two factors that are not mentioned in the above list cannot be consid-
ered as fault factors attributable to the tortfeasor. More precisely, clarity 
and precision of the norm of EU law and the position of an EU institution 
which may have contributed towards the omission do not relate to the 
wilful conduct of a Member State. The norm is either clear or not clear, 
and the position of the EU institution exists or does not. However, these 
two factors help in assessing the amount of discretionary power that the 
Member State had. Discretion and fault are inversely proportional. The 
greater the discretion, the smaller the possibility of sufﬁ ciently serious 
breach. 
Causal requirements vary depending on the basis and purpose of 
liability, which are elements determined within the relevant legal system. 
The basis and purpose of Member State liability is found within EU law. 
The purpose of the causal requirement rules is to produce a just result 
144  Downes (n 96) 300.
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by delimiting the scope of liability in a way which relates to the basis of 
liability for the conduct. These questions cannot be separated, and that is 
why national rules, at least the substantive ones, on causation are inap-
plicable. In other words, national procedural rules on causation should 
be applied by respecting the basis and purpose of Member State liability 
in EU law. Rules which determine what one is liable for in EU law are set 
within the ﬁ rst and second conditions of the Member State liability princi-
ple and together form a part of the third condition: direct causal link. The 
standard of behaviour that is set for consideration of sufﬁ cient seriousness 
of the breach will inevitably inﬂ uence causal inquiry as well. For example, 
by means of fault factors (which are relevant for determining negligence), 
it can also be determined whether a certain type of harm could have been 
foreseeable (which is relevant for legal causation).145 In a Member State 
liability case, the judge will have to apply the above-mentioned factors of 
causation in order to create an expected standard of behaviour and com-
pare the conduct that led to the harm with what was expected. 
The reasons why the Court considers certain conduct of a Member 
State to be sufﬁ ciently serious relate also to the purpose of the causal 
requirements in that same case. Legal causation should limit liability for 
the same purpose which is used to determine sufﬁ ciently serious breach. 
Sufﬁ ciently serious breach of EU law and its purpose in a certain case 
is determined by the relevant legal norm and the use of factors set by 
the court. Hence, these same factors may be used when determining an 
adequate (or legal) causal link. These factors were created by the Court 
to ﬁ t the purposes and policies of EU law. 
b) Intervening acts 
Novus actus interveniens is considered to have occurred when an act 
of the tortfeasor creates a danger which is triggered by the subsequent act 
of another person and results in damage that would not have occurred 
but for the intervention. The question relevant for causation is at what 
moment the person originally responsible for a harmful situation ceases 
to be liable for its ulterior effects and the intervener takes the blame. 
This moment seems to happen when the danger comes to the notice of a 
person who can and should prevent it. This is not so when the intervener 
still reacts to the danger created by the original tortfeasor. In the event 
of further harm, it is important to establish whether such harm was also 
foreseeable or not. Ulterior harm will be held as unforeseeable if it was 
wholly unexpected or if it was due to a novus actus interveniens.146
145  Hart and Honoré (n 7) 257-58.
146  Weir (n 90) 84-87.
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The main feature of a novus actus is that it erases the initial wrong-
doing of the defendant. But there is no simple test. Two approaches to 
ﬁ nding a novus actus exist: a) the causal approach asks whether this 
new act was reasonable (in the voluntary sense). The more unreasonable 
the intervening conduct, the more causative such a novus actus is; b) the 
approach regarding fault asks whether the intervening act was foresee-
able. The more foreseeable it was, the less causative it will be considered. 
However, if a duty to act existed to prevent the interference that occurred, 
such interference will not be considered as a novus actus.147 
In EU law, when determining the legal cause of damage, a judge 
asks whether there was some other intervening event which was so un-
reasonable, judging from the aspect of risk created by the defendant’s 
conduct, that it breaks the chain of causation. This is also applicable in 
EU law, and the Court applied the concept of novus actus interveniens in 
Brinkmann.148 This indicates that the Court used a two-stage causal in-
quiry and determined factual and legal causation. Unfortunately, in that 
case the Court reached a different conclusion than that which would 
most probably have been reached by an English judge had he handled 
the case. The Court considered that the application of EU legislation by 
national administrative bodies broke the causal chain even though such 
an act was not wholly unreasonable and unexpected when the legislator 
failed to act and implement EU law. Obviously, causal inquiry was put to 
use for the purposes of EU policy, and the Court did not see any beneﬁ t 
in sanctioning desirable behaviour by the Member State administration. 
This notion serves the same purpose in national law:
[T]he real question is, what is the damage for which the defend-
ant under consideration should be held responsible. The nature of 
his duty (here, the common law duty of care) is relevant; causation, 
certainly, will be relevant - but it will fall to be viewed, and in truth 
can only be understood, in light of the answer to the question: from 
what kind of harm was it the defendant’s duty to guard the claimant 
… Novus actus interveniens … [is] no more and no less than [a tool 
or mechanism] which the law has developed to articulate in practice 
the extent of any liable defendant’s responsibility for the loss and 
damage which the claimant has suffered.149
This leads to the conclusion that national judges should use national 
causal procedural rules for the purposes of satisfying EU law policies.
147  Dugdale (ed) (n 32) paras 2-78 and 2-96.
148  C-319/96 Brinkmann Tabakfabriken [1998] ECR I-5255.
149  Laws LJ in Rahman v Arearose Ltd & Anor [2000] EWCA Civ 190, para 33. 
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c) Purpose  
The purpose due to which a rule was created helps narrow the scope 
of liability down, and it is also referred to as the scope of the rule test. In 
a case of breach of statutory duty, this rule is quite simply applied. If the 
occurring kind of harm is the consequence of the established negligence 
and falls within the protective scope of the rule breached, then a causal 
link will be held to exist. This is easily applicable in cases of statutory 
duties but more complicated in the case of common law duties in English 
law. Common law duties are not generally applicable rules made for use 
in future cases. Therefore, in such cases instead of the scope of the rule, 
the scope of duty is the key issue which limits liability. Loss has to be the 
very thing that the obligation was trying to prevent.150
The scope of duty or the rule is sometimes presented as a causal 
problem in fault-based liability cases. In such cases, an additional limi-
tation may exist to the already established legal cause. The court may 
ask if the damage is within the scope of protection of the tort. As Den-
ning LJ reasoned in Roe v Minister of Health, the question that should 
be posed is: ‘is the consequence fairly to be regarded as within the risk 
created by the negligence?’151 If it is, then liability exists, but if it is not, 
then no liability will arise. 
In Member State liability cases, the ﬁ rst condition of liability re-
quires that the EU law confers certain rights on individuals. In a way, by 
determining this condition, the national judge will also identify the type 
of interest that the EU law intended to protect. This will consequently 
make the ﬁ nding of foreseeability of damage even simpler. In EU law, the 
ﬁ rst condition of liability and the relevant legal rule will provide the scope 
within which liability may arise in EU law. It will serve to determine the 
purpose or determine the scope of the rule. This test will provide a ﬁ nal 
limitation of legal causation and consequently liability.
In the case of adapting the national tort of breach of statutory duty 
to ﬁ t the purposes of EU law, the situation differs depending on whether 
the breach of EU law is based on fault or strict liability. If the basis of 
liability is fault, as indicated above, the statutory right and its breach 
must be determined based on EU law. Consequently, the degree of fault 
determined on the basis of EU law inﬂ uences causal inquiry. If, on the 
other hand, liability is strict in the sense that only an obligation of result 
and no discretion was given to the Member State, then causality is quite 
simply established based only on the factual chain of consequences, and 
any legal limitation of it is determined solely by the scope of the rule.
150  Weir (n 90) 88-90.
151  Roe v Minister of Health [1954] EWCA Civ 7.
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3) Defences 
English law offers various defences to defendants. Some of them 
turn on causal issues, some on damages. Contributory negligence is 
relevant to causation where liability is fault-based, while mitigation of 
damages relates to the establishment of damages. However, they are two 
sides of the same coin.152
Contributory negligence may be introduced as a defence by the de-
fendant, and leads the court back to causality in the sense that it can 
indicate a novus actus interveniens which breaks the causal chain. It is 
important to emphasise that the word ‘negligence’ is used here to de-
scribe careless conduct or lacking reasonable care, not a breach of duty 
to take care.153 This defence in English law relies only on the contribu-
tory negligence of the claimant, not of a third party. The same objective 
standard of care that was applied in negligence should be applied when 
establishing contributory negligence and analysing whether the claim-
ant has failed to take reasonable care of his own interests so as to justify 
a reduction of damages.154
Mitigation of damage is a defence introduced by the defendant which 
leads the court to reconsider the issue of damages. The effect of this 
defence is that the amount of damages payable by the defendant is re-
duced. The principle is that ‘you cannot claim compensation for items of 
damage you could reasonably have avoided or for expenditure needlessly 
incurred’.155
The defence of contributory negligence may be applied in a case of 
Member State liability but with caution. There exists the possibility of 
introducing incompatible elements of national law into an EU law claim. 
Essentially, by using this defence, the defendant reopens the issue of 
causality, because it proves that damage was caused due to the fault of 
the claimant. 
However, in practice, it is difﬁ cult to envisage circumstances in which 
an individual claimant might be held to have contributed to his loss 
caused by a breach of a treaty obligation by a Member State … The 
152  The defence of illegality states that nobody can pursue a cause of action if it relies 
on his own illegality. There also exist other defences, but the ‘[d]efences based on con-
sent, ranging from assumption of risk (volenti non ﬁ t iniuria) to exclusion clauses and no-
tices, are not available as a defence to the tort of breach of statutory duty [because] a 
person cannot escape from responsibility for a duty which has been placed upon him by
Parliament by obtaining another person’s agreement which purports to exempt him
from any liability created by that duty.’ Stanton (n 31) 336-37.
153 Walton, Cooper and Wood (n 28) 9, para 1-14.
154  Dugdale (ed) (n 32) para 8-130.
155  Weir (n 90) 128.
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defence might also be held to create an unacceptable barrier to the 
enforcement of community law in the United Kingdom.156 
Nevertheless, in the event of this defence, national judges should 
determine in what amount the fault of the claimant diminishes the suf-
ﬁ ciently serious breach of the defendant. However, is the national con-
cept of fault on the part of the individual applicable? There is no certain 
answer for now.
In respect of the principle of mitigation of damages, the Court said 
that 
in order to determine the loss or damage for which reparation may 
be granted, the national court may inquire whether the injured per-
son showed reasonable diligence in order to avoid the loss or damage 
or limit its extent and whether, in particular, he availed himself in 
time of all the legal remedies available to him.157 
As for the other defences, the claimant’s consent to harmful conduct 
is irrelevant in EU law, as it cannot be introduced under a breach of EU 
law. The defence of the claimant’s illegality would, in the author’s opin-
ion, be available in a Member State liability case if it respected the basic 
principles of EU law. 
E) Causation if liability is strict
The standard causal two-step inquiry consisting of the cause in 
fact and legal cause is present in cases of strict liability as well. The 
ﬁ rst step is always the same and consists of proving the factual chain of 
consequences. Strict liability implications become visible in the second 
step. That is why Honoré asserts that the risk theory has two aspects 
when applied in practice. On one hand, it is restrictive because recovery 
of damages is possible only if harm is within the risk that the duty is 
intended to guard against. On the other hand, it is extensive because it 
does away with all causal tests if the harm is within that risk. In other 
words, if the defendant’s act is a necessary condition of the resulting 
harm, this is enough to establish liability.158 
The foreseeability test cannot be used to determine the extent of li-
ability in cases of strict or absolute liability.159 It all depends on the stat-
ute. Liability will be deemed strict if a provision uses the words ‘must’ or 
156  Stanton (n 31) 336.
157  Brasserie (n 2) para 84.
158  Hart and Honoré (n 7) 287.
159  McGregor (n 137) 109, para 6-012.
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‘shall’ with reference to a certain duty.160 If liability is strict, the test of 
foreseeability is irrelevant. Once strict liability is established, all result-
ing damages may be claimed regardless of the foreseeability of a certain 
kind of damage. In such cases, national courts apply the Gorris v Scott161 
test. The damage that occurred must be of the kind that the statute 
was aiming to prevent. The manner of occurrence is generally irrelevant. 
Causation and damage in a strict liability tort such as breach of statu-
tory duty do not create a big hurdle because fault is not required.162 The 
only limit that the courts apply is the scope or purpose of the norm test, 
and reparation of damage will be allowed if the harm is within the risk 
prescribed by the norm.163
The Court reasoned in Rechberger164 that EU law placed an obliga-
tion of result upon Member States. This created the basis of strict liabil-
ity. The Court continued and said that 
[i]n those circumstances, the Member State’s liability for breach of 
Article 7 of the Directive cannot be precluded by imprudent conduct 
on the part of the travel organiser or by the occurrence of exceptional 
and unforeseeable events … Such a guarantee [as required by the 
directive] is speciﬁ cally aimed at arming consumers against the con-
sequences of the bankruptcy, whatever the causes of it may be.165
What this means is that fault does not play any role in cases of 
strict liability. Foreseeability is irrelevant if liability occurs automati-
cally when a certain result imposed by the statute is not reached. In this 
sense, English law and EU law are compatible. The only emphasis that 
should be made at this point is that in cases of EU law the national judge 
should analyse whether the particular provision of EU law imposed the 
obligation of result on the State. If it did, the basis of liability is strict and 
causation is only factual. 
In national law, the standard of care is the primary element that 
deﬁ nes causation. If that is so, then there is no dilemma in Member 
State liability cases. When breach of EU law is based on strict liability, 
then the provision of EU law determines the standard of care. However, 
in strict liability cases, the standard of care should not be an issue at 
160  Harpwood (n 51) 193-94.
161  Gorris v Scott [1874] LR 9 Ex 125.
162  R Rebhahn, ‘Public Liability in Comparison - England, France, Germany’ in H Koziol 
and BC Steininger (eds), European Tort Law (Springer-Verlag 2006) 78.
163  Weir (n 90) 100; Hart and Honoré (n 7) 286.
164  ‘Ii]t should be pointed out that Article 7 of the Directive imposes an obligation of result, 
namely to guarantee package travellers the refund of money paid over and their repatriation 
in the event of the travel organiser’s bankruptcy.’ See Rechberger (n 92) para 74.
165  Rechberger (n 92) paras 74-75.
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all, as it is the realisation of the risk prescribed in the norm that trig-
gers liability. In EU law, the two bases of liability are clearly divided and 
the standard of care is only relevant in the analysis of sufﬁ ciently seri-
ous breach. This is not the case in national law, because the breach of 
statutory duty may be based on strict or fault liability. In addition, even 
in cases where liability should be strict (in the absolute sense) in English 
law, fault very often ﬁ nds a way in. This is why scholars elaborate on the 
standard of care even in cases of strict liability. However, in EU law, the 
matter is for now clear, and strict liability puts an obligation of result on 
the Member State which renders the standard of care irrelevant.
F) Damages
The issue of damages will be touched upon only brieﬂ y. This con-
dition also inﬂ uences the establishment of causal link, but it would be 
going outside the primary aim of this article if such interaction was dis-
cussed, as it is a rather complex one. 
The Court has only given general indications of which harm may be 
reparable and which may not. It is clear that national rules setting an 
upper limit to the amount of damages that can be claimed are invalid in 
cases of EU law.166 Pure economic loss is not excluded but Member States 
may put limits on it, provided that the principles of effectiveness and 
equality of EU law are respected.167 
On the availability of exemplary damages, the Court has said that 
‘such damages are based under domestic law … [A]n award of exemplary 
damages pursuant to a claim or an action founded on Community law 
cannot be ruled out if such damages could be awarded pursuant to a 
similar claim or action founded on domestic law.’168 
Reparation for loss or damage caused by breach of EU law must 
be commensurate with the loss or damage sustained by the individ-
ual, which does not exclude pure economic loss. The national court 
may also inquire into the issue of mitigation of damages and determine 
whether the injured individual was reasonably diligent in avoiding or 
limiting loss or damage and if he or she used the available legal rem-
edies in time.169
166  Craig (n 37) 929.
167  Brasserie (n 2) paras 83, 87; Stanton and others (n 66) 248-49, paras 6.045, 6.046.
168  Brasserie (n 2) para 89.
169  Brasserie (n 2) paras 82, 84, 87.
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V Conclusion
It has been shown that English law uses the same tests when deter-
mining whether a defendant was negligent and whether that defendant 
was responsible for a particular loss. Therefore, in a Member State liabil-
ity case, the questions whether a defendant has committed a sufﬁ ciently 
serious breach and whether he has caused damage must also be deter-
mined by the same test. Causal requirements are a result of the rules 
of law which deﬁ ne the existence of liability. That is why the issue of 
causality in EU law cannot be divorced from the question of sufﬁ ciently 
serious breach and the rule of law which confers rights on the individual. 
It cannot depend entirely on national law.
In English law, causation is established in two stages: factual cau-
sation and legal causation. Even though this issue depends on the facts 
of the case, it is the law that formulates the question. The question for 
the test of factual causation in EU law would thus be: would the dam-
age have occurred but for the sufﬁ ciently serious breach of the defendant? 
Rather than any concept of fault, carelessness or negligence, the test 
applies the standard of conduct set within EU law. In the second stage, 
where causes are limited to only legally relevant ones, foreseeability is 
again the key factor used to determine the extent of the defendant’s li-
ability (just as it was a key factor in determining the breach of the duty 
of care and carelessness). Legal causation or remoteness is determined 
based on reasonable foreseeability of the kind of damage that occurred 
in the case at hand. The role of ‘foreseeability’ in EU law is played by 
the factors of sufﬁ ciently serious breach which help establish a certain 
expected standard of conduct in each case. Therefore, factors indicating 
the existence of serious breach are also factors which should be used for 
determining the existence of legally relevant causation:
- if the Member State acted with intention to breach EU law, this 
was one of the factors that caused harm;
- if the Member State acted outside of the discretion given by EU 
law, this was one of the factors that caused harm;
- if the error committed by the Member State was inexcusable, this 
was one of the factors that caused harm;
- the failure of the Member State to abandon national measures 
contrary to EU law was one of the factors that caused harm.
Therefore, the basis, content and function of the test of foreseeability 
that is used in determining breach on the one hand and legal causation 
on the other is the same. The basis is always the defendant’s conduct, 
the content is a certain expected behaviour, and the function in ques-
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tion is the assessment of probabilities. In the logic of Lord Hoffmann,170 
the concept of sufﬁ ciently serious breach, while helping regulate which 
conduct will be considered as breaching EU law, also inﬂ uences the 
creation of causal rules in each particular case. The two cannot be di-
vorced, because legally relevant causation has the purpose of limiting 
liability in accordance with the reasons why liability is provided for in 
the ﬁ rst place.
170  ‘The concepts of fairness, justice and reason underlie the rules which state the causal 
requirements of liability for a particular form of conduct (or non-causal limits on that li-
ability) just as much as they underlie the rules which determine that conduct to be tortious. 
And the two are inextricably linked together: the purpose of the causal requirement rules 
is to produce a just result by delimiting the scope of liability in a way which relates to the 
reasons why liability for the conduct in question exists in the ﬁ rst place.’ See Lord Hoffman 
in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd (n 95) para 56.
